Barack Obama:
Interview, by Michael Gordon and Jeff Zeleny
October 31, 2007
Following is an
interview of Barack Obama, conducted by Michael Gordon and Jeff Zeleny of the
New York Times:
Q. When
you formulate your position for where we go from here in Iraq, which
experts do you consult with? What informs your judgment and
assessment of the next steps?
Senator Barack Obama: Well, we have a pretty wide circle of
advisers. We talk to everybody from the usual suspects in Washington
– various foreign policy experts – to mid-rank military officers,
many of whom have served in Iraq, to higher ranking officers like
General Scott Gration who flew repeated combat missions and has
helped to advise us on a range of these issues and people like
Richard Danzig, who is one of our key foreign policy advisers. So
it’s a pretty wide circle.
Obviously, I keep up with the reports that are coming directly from
the field as well, although, we’re usually one step removed. My
former foreign policy adviser is a Naval intelligence officer who is
stationed in Anbar – he’s obviously doing his thing, he’s not
reporting his observations – we don’t have people on-line reporting
to us on a regular basis so the information is coming back to us a
month late, two months late, depending on the rotation.
But we are certainly taking into account what we are hearing in the
field, from mid-level officers and a general assessment that we’re
receiving from them, is the same assessment that you’re reporting in
the newspapers, which is that the surge has had some impact that is
to be hoped for. We put in an additional 30,000 troops that there
has been some lessoning of the horrific violence that we were seeing
last year and earlier this year, but that we still have a situation
which there is an ongoing sectarian conflict, that violence is still
occurring.
The way I view my roll as a candidate and as president is to look at
the broader strategic concerns that this country has to face. My
plan is premised on those broader strategic concerns, understanding
that I’m going to be in constant consultation with the military in
terms of how we tactically execute a strategy that’s been put
forward, a strategy’s not going to be formed in a vacuum and we’re
going to have to listen to the actual troops in the field.
Q. So if you become president in January 2009, you’d be inheriting a
situation where it seems there would be in excess of 100,000 troops
in Iraq or somewhere around that number – between 10 to 12 combat
brigades – or some reduced level of violence, but still significant
sectarian tensions, what would be the first step you would take as
president?
A. My first step would be to call in the joint chiefs of staff, the
military commanders who are on the ground and most familiar with the
situation there. I’m assuming that Petraeus might still be our lead
in shaping our activities there and assign a new mission, which his
that we’re going to begin a phased redeployment. It is going to be
responsible. It is going to be taking pace at a … It will be
conducted at a pace that will ensure the safety of our troops that
will give us time to fill the diplomatic void that I believe the
president has left, in both Iraq and in the region. It will provide
us the time to engage in the humanitarian activities that are going
to be necessary because the humanitarian crisis that is projected
for withdrawal has actually already occurred.
We’ve already gotten huge numbers of internally displaced Iraqis as
well as Iraqis in other countries, so my job is to say to them, my
strategic goal is to get us out of the business of street patrols
and counter insurgency. We are not going to be engaging in combat
activities day-to-day in Iraq. How do we do that responsibly and
safely for our troops and how do we marry that and how do we couple
that with the kinds of strong efforts and humanitarian efforts that
are going to be required to stabilize the country.”
Q. Ambassador Crocker told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
that if the United States withdrew forces on a chronological
schedule, without adjustments to take account of developments, it
would backfire. It would not succeed on putting pressure on the
Iraqi government to achieve a political accommodation. How do you
assess that argument?
A. I fundamentally disagree with the ambassador on this. I think
Ambassador Crocker, as well as General Petraeus are trying to play a
bad hand well and are trying to play out the mission that has been
given to them. But I see no evidence, whatsoever, that our actions
to date have encouraged the kinds of political reconciliation that
has been the objective of the surge and our purported objective of
the last several years. I believe the reverse.
I think the only way we are going to get the Iraqi factions, as well
as powers in the region that don’t have an interest in seeing Iraq
collapse, to focus their attention on what are the compromises and
accommodations that we have to make is if they understand that we
are proceeding with a withdrawal, that we are not going to maintain
permanent bases there, that there is going to be a new reality on
the ground and they are going to have to make the series of
decisions that they may have been putting off for a very long time.
Q. Following that up, what is your schedule for withdrawing forces
from Iraq? How fast would these withdrawals be carried out? What
time frame?
A. Based on the conversations we’ve had internally as well as
external reports, we believe that you can get one to two brigades
out a month. At that pace, the forces would be out in approximately
16 months from the time that we began. That would be the time frame
that I would be setting up. That also gives us time to make sure
that we are strengthening the Iraqi forces. Obviously, I would
prefer that we start this process now, but let’s assume that there
are 100,000 troops when I get there, that means that we’re talking
14 to 15 months from now.
According to all the reports, we should have been well along our way
in getting the Iraqi security forces to be more functional. We then
have another 16 months after that to adjust the withdrawal and make
sure that we are withdrawing from those areas, based on advice from
the military officers in the field, those places where we are
secured, made progress and we’re not just willy-nilly removing
troops, but we’re making a determination – in this region we see
some stability. We’ve had cooperation from local tribal leaders and
local officials, so we can afford to remove troops here. Here, we’ve
still got problems, it’s going to take a little bit longer. Maybe
those are the last areas to pull out.
Q. If you saw that the Iraqi government, under the duress of
American withdrawals, was not making progress or if sectarian
violence was beginning to increase in Iraq, would you call a halt to
withdrawals or proceed anyway?
A. I think that it is important to understand that there are no good
options in Iraq. There haven’t been for a very long time. I’ve said
previously that I would not be surprised to see some spikes in
violence as we begin the withdrawal. It is not going to be a
perfectly smooth transition. But I think there is a way of managing
this that keeps this violence contained. Now, at some point the
Iraqis are going to have to respond to a change in the security
situation inside Iraq, one way or another, and those in the region
are going to have to respond as well.
During that 16 months, I’m engaging in very systematic, tough
diplomacy, not just with the various factions in the region, but
also with Iran, with Syria, the Saudis, Jordan, with the United
Nationals Security Council program members. Once it’s clear that we
are not intending to stay there for 10 years or 20 years, all these
parties have an interest in figuring out how do we adjust in a way
that stabilizes the situation. They’re all going to have a series of
complex differences and we’re going to, obviously, have to monitor
it carefully about what those interests are to make sure our
interests are protected. But what I don’t want to do is to make our
withdrawal contingent on the Iraqi government doing the right thing
because that empowers them to make strategic decisions that should
be made by the president of the United States.”
Q. The Bush administration has little influence on Iranian behavior
in Iraq. How would you elicit cooperation from Iran and Syria that
the Bush administration has failed to obtain? Would we offer
assurances that we would not be engaged in a policy of regime
change. What would you do?
A. I think you foreshadowed my answer. You’ve got the Bush
administration expecting Crocker to make progress on the very narrow
issue of helping Shia militias at the same time as you’ve got Dick
Cheney giving a speech saying it is very likely that we may engage
in military action in Iran and the United States Senate passing a
resolution, suggesting that our force structure inside Iraq is
dependent in someway on blunting Iranian influence. You can’t engage
in diplomacy in isolation. There’s got to be a broader strategic
context to it.
The Iranians and the Syrians are acting irresponsibly inside Iraq.
They perceive that it is a way to leverage or impact or weaken us at
a time when they’re worried about United States action in a broader
context. I’ve already said, I would meet directly with Iranian
leaders. I would meet directly with Syrian leaders. We would engage
in a level of aggressive personal diplomacy in which a whole host of
issues are on the table. We’re not looking at Iraq, just in
isolation. Iran and Syria would start changing their behavior if
they started seeing that they had some incentives to do so, but
right now the only incentive that exists is our president suggesting
that if you do what we tell you, we may not blow you up.
My belief about the regional powers in the Middle East is that they
don’t respond well to that kind of bluster. They haven’t in the
past, there’s no reason to think they will in the future. On the
other hand, what we know, is that, for example, in the early days of
our Afghanistan offensive, the Iranians we’re willing to cooperate
when we had more open lines of dialogue and we were able to identify
interests that were compatible with theirs.”
Q. So what assurances would you offer them to get them to be more
cooperative – try to convince them that the U.S. would not pursue
regime change?
A. There are a series of serious problems that we have. Iraq is one.
Their development of nuclear weapons is another. Their support of
terrorist activities – Hezbollah and Hamas are a third. On all these
fronts, we’ve got severe issues with their actions. We expect them
to desist from those actions, but what we are also willing to say is
as a consequence of their changes in behavior, we are willing to
examine their membership in the W.T.O., we are willing to look at
how can we assure that they’ve got the kinds of economic
relationships that can help grow their economy.
We are willing to talk about certain assurances in the context of
them showing some good faith. I think it is important for us to send
a signal that we are not hell bent on regime change, just for the
sake of regime change, but expect changes in behavior and there are
both carrots and there are sticks available to them for those
changes in behavior. Where those conversations go is not yet clear,
but what is absolutely clear is that the path that we are on now is
not going to make our troops in Iraq safer. Iran has shown no
inclination to back off of their support of Shia militias as a
consequence of the threats that they’ve been receiving from the Bush
and Cheney administration. If anything, it probably accelerates
their interest in trying to make a situation in Iraq as
uncomfortable as possible for us.”
Q. Would you be seeking a comprehensive rapprochement or if Iran
insisted on pursuing their weapons programs, which is entirely
possible, would you still try to carve out some sort of side
arrangement that would pertain to stability? And what would you be
prepared to offer?
A. I can’t anticipate what their response would be. What I can
anticipate is that the act of us reaching out to them in a series
way, empowered by the Oval Office, not that we’ll have Crocker over
here doing something, while we do something else, but a serious,
coordinated diplomatic effort will, if nothing else, change world
opinion about our approach to Iran and will strengthen our ability
should they choose not to stand down on the nuclear issue, for
example, or to continue to engage in hostile activity even if
directly inside Iraq, that it greatly strengthens our position with
our allies – both in the region and around the world and strengthens
our capacity to impose tougher economic sanctions and take other
steps, not in isolation, but as part of a broader international
effort.
Q. If you were to open such a discussion with Iran, would you retain
a military option for striking Iran’s nuclear facilities if they
persisted on that course, or do you believe that it would be wiser
to craft a deterrent and detainment strategy for Iran and acquiesce
their nuclear capability?
A. I don’t think the president of the United States takes military
options off the table, but I think that we obviously have to measure
costs and benefits in all the decisions that we make. Iran is one
problem. Pakistan is another problem. Afghanistan is another. Iraq
is yet another. My decision making, with respect to military options
versus diplomatic options, a containment strategy versus a strike
strategy, is going to be informed by how is that going to impact not
just Iran, but how is that going to impact the stability of the
region and how’s that going to impact our long-term security
interests. One of the fundamental differences that I’ve had with
consistently with the Bush administration, is that we look at all
these things in isolation and as a consequence, we never ask
ourselves the very simple question that John Warner asked in the
Armed Services Committee when he was talking to Petraeus, ‘Is this
making us safer?’ That is ultimately is our goal.
Q. When Vice President Cheney said we cannot allow Iran to become a
nuclear weapon state, do you agree with that?
A. What I believe is that we should do everything in our power to
prevent that in the broader context of our long-term security
interests.
Q. And if we fail to prevent it?
A. I’m not going to speculate on whether we’re going to fail.
Q. You’ve argued that the United States should leave behind residual
force in Iraq and the region. How large would the force be and how
much would be inside Iraq versus the Persian Gulf Region?
A. I have not ascribed particular numbers to that and I won’t for
precisely the reason I was just talking to Michael about. I want to
talk to military folks on the ground, No. 1. No. 2, a lot of it
depends on what’s happened on the political front and the diplomatic
front. Even something as simple as protecting our embassy is going
to be dependent on what is the security environment in Baghdad. If
there is some sense of security, then that means one level of force.
If you continue to have significant sectarian conflict, that means
another, but this is an area where Senator Clinton and I do have a
significant contrast.
I do not believe that we can remove troops at the pace, for example,
that Governor Richardson was talking about. I do think it is
important for us not only to protect our embassy, but also to engage
in counter-terrorism activities. We’ve seen progress against AQI [Al
Qaeda in Iraq], but they are a resilient group and there’s the
possibility that they might try to set up new bases. I think that we
should have some strike capability. But that is a very narrow
mission, that we get in the business of counter terrorism as opposed
to counter insurgency and even on the training and logistics front,
what I have said is, if we have not seen progress politically, then
our training approach should be greatly circumscribed or eliminated.
I am happy to train a government that is functioning as a national
government. I do not want us to be in the business of training and
equipping factions or militias that are going to be turning on each
other. I want to be absolutely clear about this, because this has
come up in a series of debates: I will remove all our combat troops,
we will have troops there to protect our embassies and our civilian
forces and we will engage in counter terrorism activities. How large
that force is, whether it’s located inside Iraq or as an over the
horizon force is going to depend on what our military situation is.
What we’re not going to be doing is engaging in broad-based counter
insurgency. We’re not going to be providing long-term and constant
embedded training operations and logistical training operations and
the sort that, I think, Senator Clinton has in some cases talked
about. We’re certainly not going to be engaging in what I consider
mission creep, where we are structuring our forces based on
preventing Iranian influence in Iraq, something that Senator Clinton
has talked about as a possibility in a previous interview. We’re not
going to be using forces there to strike at what she’s called other
terrorist organizations, without being clear as to whether those are
just terrorist organizations inside Iraq or terrorist organizations
outside Iraq. We’re going to be focused very narrowly on making sure
that Al Qaeda in Iraq and terrorist activities in Iraq are
prevented.”
Q. Senator Clinton has suggested that the differences among leading
Democrats are largely semantics, do you agree?
A. I think her disagreement with Senator Edwards may be a semantical
difference, in the sense that if we’re going after terrorists,
there’s combat involved, presumably. On that front, I don’t disagree
with her that going after terrorists is a combat function. But it
appears that based on interviews – and maybe she’ll clarify – that
the mission that she is envisioning is a much larger one than the
one that I’m envisioning. There’s been a pretty long list of the
things that she wants to accomplish. We have a very narrow list of
things that we want to accomplish: protecting embassies, protecting
civilians and counter terrorism in contrast to counter insurgency.
Q. You said the residual force might be in Iraq or in the region,
but in the September speech you said the force would be in Iraq.
Which is it, is it going to be in Iraq or in the region?
A. It’s going to depend on what the situation is. I have said that I
don’t want permanent bases in Iraq. I said that in September and I
will continue to say that. Whether that counter terrorism activity
can be conducted best by maintaining those forces in Iraq or whether
it’s possible to have them deployed in places like Kuwait is going
to be something that I determine based on how best we can carry out
those functions and what the military advisers are suggesting will
be most effective.
Q. So just to clarify, what you’re saying is the counter-terrorism
mission might not be based in Iraq?
A. That is a mission that we have to carry out, but we ought to do
by how best to accomplish it. It’s conceivable that we may be able
to locate that counter terrorism force outside of Iraq. There may be
larger strategic and political reasons why it would be advantageous
to have it outside of Iraq, but I don’t want to hamstring our
military from being able to strike at terrorist targets
successfully. That should be a priority.
Q. What would be the advantages of not having it in Iraq?
A. It depends on how the political negotiations are going, both on
the Iraqis as well as on the regional powers. If it’s viewed as more
provocative inside Iraq, and we can do the job just as well,
locating them elsewhere, then that would obviously bear on my
decision making.
Q. In your plan presented in September, you mentioned if there was
widespread sectarian killing, you said you would reserve the right
to send American forces back into Iraq as part of an international
effort to stem the sectarian killings and to protect the population.
So there are some circumstances that even after the pullout of
combat forces, you would envision a population security mission.
Would you be prepared to do this unilaterally? How bad would it have
to be before you would contemplate going back into Iraq?
A. I don’t think this is something that you can perfectly calibrate.
You have to look at the situation on the ground. As I’ve already
noted, I believe that there will be a spike in violence as we make a
transition. Keep in mind that I think that there’s going to be more
violence over the long haul by us not changing the course, so I’m
weighing – again – bad options.
It is conceivable that there comes a point where things descend into
the mayhem that shocks the conscience and we say to ourselves, this
is not acceptable, anymore that what happened in Darfur is not
acceptable. At that point, my strong, strong preference would be to
work in concert with the international community. Now I think there
are some things that we can do to prevent some of that, that are
non-military. I think it’s important, and I mentioned this in the
speech in September, for us to start setting up an international
commission that is tracking some of the activities that are going on
in Iraq and allow for the perpetrators of mass violence to be held
accountable.
Now, obviously, we’re not in a very strong footing right now to do
that, when we just provide immunity to Blackwater Security Forces.
That undercuts that message. Part of what we want to have is a
structure in place that says, ‘We’re starting to keep track of
what’s going on and there’s an international mandate to insure that
crimes against humanity are not taking place.”
Q. Presumably, the purpose would be to discourage the sectarian acts
that would compel you to go back into Iraq. In terms of enforcement,
would you then try to apprehend the war criminals, the way it’s done
in the Balkans, taken into custody? Or would it be to simply put
them on a list?
A. If you’ve got a red line and that red line is crossed, part of
what you want to see is the international community taking action.
This is not going to happen smoothly, but it hasn’t happened
smoothly in the Balkans. It hasn’t happened smoothly in Africa. But
it begins to create a norm that people understand the international
community may enforce and it offers not a perfect, but a modest
prophylactic to the kind of activities that not just the United
States, but all people around the world want to prevent.
Q. The international participation in Iraq is limited and declining
by the day. Would you, as president, be prepared to act essentially
alone if need be to carry out the steps or would you only do it if
you could attract allied support?
A. It is unlikely there is going to be much of a contribution in
today’s political environment. I don’t think we should underestimate
the capacity of the next president to fundamentally change that
political environment internationally. Part of the reason I’m
running for president is because I believe I can offer a fresh start
to our diplomatic efforts abroad. Now there is no doubt, I don’t
want to sound Pollyannaish about this, that our allies are not just
jumping at the chance to get into Iraq. Certainly their populations
are not interested in seeing a whole bunch of German or French or
Canadian troops pouring into Iraq.
I think there’s a big difference between their willingness to enable
the United States down a course that they’ve already concluded is
failed and counterproductive and us going to them with an entirely
new strategy that has been executed and designed to lower our
footprint, reduce our footprint, inside Iraq. But then to also say
to them, there are certain obligations that we as an international
community have. And there are strategic interests that we must
pursue. The Germans can’t afford to see oil prices go up another
$30, $40, $50 a barrel. That’s going to have an impact on their
economy.
There are certain issues that they’re going to have to consider as
we take those steps. Again, I don’t want to overstate my optimism,
but I do think our capacity to get a coalition of forces to deal
with what could be a problem, and keep in mind we’re speculating, we
don’t know whether this is in fact a problem, but I acknowledge that
you never know what could happen. I think it’s important for us to
know that if we’ve done our diplomacy right and if we’ve made our
intentions clear, which is not a long-term occupation in Iraq, but
rather arriving at the sort of political stability that is
sustainable, that we may get different levels of cooperation from
our allies than we’re currently getting.
Q. So you would do it unilaterally or you would only do it
multi-laterally in terms of committed forces?
A. We’re talking too speculatively right now for me to answer.
Q. If you’re asking voters to consider your judgment? What kind of
people would you populate your administration with? What kind of
person would be a defense secretary candidate or a candidate for
national security adviser?
A. On the issue of judgment, I absolutely think that the decision
about who the next president should be has everything to do with
judgment and character. I will say when it comes to the most
important issues in foreign policy that we’ve faced over the last
several years, my judgment has been better than my opponents.
Q. Who would you fill your administration with?
A. Our campaign is already building a group of advisers who have
expertise, in the diplomatic realm and the military realm, that
rivals any of my opponents – Republican or Democrat. Dennis can
provide you with a list of who our foreign policy advisers are. It
will give you a pretty good sense of who we’re talking to – people
ranging from Tony Lake to Susan Rice to Greg Craig to Richard
Danzig, Scott Gration, Tony McPeak, there’s a wide range of people
who I consult with on a regular basis on these issues. We’d be happy
to provide you with a list of people who have officially been
working with us on a whole range of foreign policy issues.
Now, in terms of how I would approach the Secretary of Defense job,
in particular, why don’t we just focus on that for a second. I want
the best person, I want somebody who – the reason I say the best
person regardless of party – I want somebody who has enough
credibility with the military that that person can strengthen the
link between our non-military national security apparatus and our
military apparatus. Our civilian side and our military side
obviously were strained deeply under Rumsfeld. I had a conversation
with a group of retired generals and they were absolutely adamant
that the fact that we always talk about reshaping our military, but
we never have a conversation about reshaping our national security
apparatus so those two things work together in a more coordinated
fashion.
I want somebody in the Secretary of Defense office who has enough
credibility to sell our military on the idea that we’re really going
to be serious about making progress on those other elements of
security that have been neglected under the Bush administration. I
want also that Secretary of Defense to be someone who has the
confidence of mid-rank officers and troops on the ground that their
interests are being looked after. That they are not just being sent
into missions based on ideology or based on preconceived notions,
but that somebody is their advocate.
One of the things that has happened during the course of this
campaign is that you meet remarkable young men and women who have
been doing everything that we’ve asked of them, made enormous
sacrifices and oftentimes they don’t feel as if those in the higher
ranks are thinking about them, certainly don’t feel as if they are
being thought about after they leave.”
Q. In your book, you refer to your January 2006 visit to Iraq, I
think that’s the last time you were there. Why….
A. Given how important this is, why haven’t I gone back?
Q. If you think of all the things that have happened since January
’06, there was the bombing of the mosque in Samara, the rise of the
sectarian violence, the replacement of General Casey with General
Petraeus, the introduction of the so-called surge strategy, this
whole business of Anbar and the rise of the tribes and working with
former insurgents has all emerged since then. There’s been enormous
changes there, although it’s still an extremely difficult situation.
Why haven’t you returned, given the centrality of this issue to the
campaign?
A. I’ll be honest with you. Part of it is that my schedule is such
that the trips would be one or two days and would be centered
primarily around the Green Zone. We might take a helicopter and drop
in for a moment somewhere and then come back out. There hasn’t been
the sense that the information that I was going to be getting there
was going to be significantly different than the information that
I’m getting here. But it is something that what I know I have missed
form the trips there is the interaction with the troops. So I’m
seeing the troops here, but I haven’t seen the troops in Iraq in
quite some time and I think that’s something that we’d like to make
happen.
Q. Does that mean you’re going back to Iraq?
A. I suspect we will be going back. It probably won’t be before
Iowa, realistically speaking.
Q. Obviously, there is an enormous desire among Democratic base to
pull American forces out of Iraq...On the other hand, no one wants
to give Al Qaeda in Iraq any kind of a free hand. But I wonder as
you think through this mission, how realistic it really is to posit
a counter terrorism capability for Iraq, outside of Iraq and to have
such a small force? ....One is an intelligence issue. The way the
U.S. military gathers intelligence about Al Qaeda now is really
being in and around the country with the population. It’s a means of
deriving human intelligence and if you don’t have that, you’re
essentially relying entirely on the Iraqis or ....reconnaissance
systems from above, so it limits your access to intelligence.
Certainly, it limits your responsiveness if you’re not in the
country. And also, when they do counter terrorism in Iraq now, it’s
not simply an operation by special operations forces.....If you
think back to the Democratic critique of the Bush administration’s
performance in Afghanistan, when bin Laden got away, that was a
mission when we relied entirely on special operations forces and
local forces and didn’t have sufficient troops to capture anyone or
cordon an area off, which makes me wonder how effective a
counterterrorism mission can be without a conventional capability in
country. Lastly, if there is progress toward political
accommodation, you are going to assume the role of training the
Iraqi military to some extent, which means you’re going to have a
substantial number of trainers in and among these Iraqi forces….
A. Who need to be protected.
Q. ....So when you think this through, obviously you put a lot of
effort into what is a very detailed plan which you unveiled in
September, why does this lead you to the conclusion that you don’t
need to have conventional combat capabilities in Iraq and you can
afford to take them all out and maybe not even have special
operations forces in Iraq?
A. You raise a series of legitimate questions. As commander in
chief, I’m not going to leave trainers unprotected. In our
counterterrorism efforts, I’m not going to have a situation where
our efforts can’t be successful. We will structure those forces so
they can be successful. We would still have human intelligence
capabilities on the ground. Some of them would be civilian, as
opposed to military, some would be operating out of our bases as
well as our signal intelligence.
But the analogy with what happened in Afghanistan is somewhat
different in the sense that you had the opportunity there,
potentially, to dismantle the entire leadership operation of Al
Qaeda international, which was the main objective of our invasion
into Iraq and we failed on that central mission. With respect to Al
Qaeda in Iraq, my hope is if we’ve done our job, they continue to be
much weakened, they don’t have any obvious key leadership that is a
rallying point for operations there. We may not have the same kinds
of broad-based requirements that we might have needed in Afghanistan
or Tora Bora.
But listen, I am not going to set up our troops for failure and I’m
going to do something half-baked. If the commanders tell me that
they need X, Y and Z, in order to accomplish the very narrow mission
that I’ve laid out, than I will take that into consideration.”
Q. So how will you protect the trainers without forces in Iraq?
A. The trainers are going to have to be provided with missions that
don’t put them in vulnerable situations. Understand, Michael, part
of what my goal is is that the trainers are not constantly embedded
in combat operations because part of what we’re trying to set up is
a situation where that combat is not constantly happening.
What I don’t want is trainers who are embedded in Iraqi security
forces that are engaging in sectarian warfare. That’s part of what
we need to change. Where are trainers are most in danger right now
and where they have to have a significant protective force around
them is in situations where you don’t know whose shooting at who and
you don’t know whose side is fighting Americans and which side is
fighting Shia and which side is fighting Sunni. That’s precisely why
I think it’s so important for us to pull back, so that we have some
clarity strategically about what exactly our mission is.
Q. Where does Senator Obama’s position clearly differ from Senator
Clinton’s on the way forward? Obviously there are a lot of
similarities. Granted there are profound differences in what
happened in the past.
A. As you know, you don’t want to look backwards, but obviously our
general view about this mission as a whole has been very different.
She missed the strategic interests that should have dictated whether
we went to Iraq in the first place or not, but she has not been
clear about the pace of withdrawal and I have.
She has not been clear about an end date for withdrawal and
obviously, those two things are related, and I have. I think it’s
important to provide some clarity, both to the Iraqis as well as to
our military about what we should be trying to accomplish. The
follow-on force, we already discussed. The projected mission that
she has for our forces there is more extensive than mine and is more
ambiguous than mine. When she refers to counter terrorism, she
refers to other terrorist organizations. She’s not clear whether
those are other terrorist organizations in Iraq, like the PKK. Is
she referring to organizations outside of Iraq.
That’s something she would have to clarify, but when I refer to it,
I refer to it exclusively as Al Qaeda in Iraq. Those actors that are
carrying out violence in Iraq that could potentially have
ramifications for our troops, our bases and so forth. We have a
tighter mission than she has put forward in terms of what those
forces would look like. We have a significant difference and this is
related to how we set up the follow-on force. She implied in March
that part of how the forces in Iraq would be structured would be
with an eye to blunting Iranian influence inside Iraq and that is
consistent with her position on the Kyl-Lieberman resolution, which
again suggests that our Iraqi forces should be structured with an
eye to blunt Iranian influence. I think that is a mistake. I think
that is mission creep.
I think that is very hard for us to suggest that we will maintain
forces in what we have called a sovereign country, whose government
has relations with Iran, if part of our job is to blunt the
influence of Iran. I don’t know that Maliki has signed off on that
function. I don’t know that the majority of the Iraqi legislature
has suggested that’s an appropriate function for our troops in Iraq.
This is part of the broader context of how, I think, we have to
untangle this web that’s been created by George Bush.
Senator Clinton seems to be comfortable with this notion that
somehow even though the single thing that has made Iran more
formidable of a threat is our invasion of Iraq that now that becomes
the pretext for us continuing down that same course. I think we have
to change course – fundamentally. It’s not helpful for us to say
that haven’t troops in Iraq with an eye toward preventing Iran from
having influence is a fundamentally different shift from the way
George Bush has approached this. On the diplomatic front, which
respect to Iran and Syria, I have said that as president I would
engage in direct talks with them that focus on Iraq, but also focus
on the larger strategic problems that we face in the region.”
Q. But there is one respect in which you have a more expansive
approach to Iraq than she does in that you identify in your plan the
possibility of going back into Iraq to protect the population if
there’s an all-out civil war.
A. I mean let’s …
Q. And providing monitors to help the population relocate and go
after war criminals. Those are three elements – those are new
missions for Americans after Iraq that she doesn’t postulate.
A. But they aren’t necessarily military missions.
Q. But how do you go back into Iraq without military forces?
A. No, no, no, no, no. You conflated three things. The latter two
that you talked about are not military missions. Let’s just be clear
about that.
Q. An armed escort is not a military mission?
A. Look, I want to be clear about what I’ve said. I think it would
be irresponsible for a president to suggest that there are no
circumstances – ever – in which we would consider military action as
a consequence of humanitarian concerns. I think we have seen great
cruelty in our history, over the last 100 years. If there are ways
for us to prevent wholesale slaughter, then I think that’s something
that we have to look at. I have not suggested that is a mission that
I have set forth.
I do think there’s a difference between me saying, I do not
anticipate that happening, because I think we can execute our
withdrawal in an effective way. So that is not part of the plan that
I’m setting forward in terms of how we get out of Iraq. What I am
saying is that I as president am obviously going to be mindful of
the possibility of humanitarian disaster and if that were to occur,
I am not ruling out that we wouldn’t take steps in concert with
other nations – even if it was short term – to ensure that a
wholesale disaster did not take place. |
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